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Abstract: The objective of this paper is to integrate economic and sociological elements 
in a model of human capital accumulation by phenotypically distinct individuals. Both 
kinds of elements  are influenced by  the degree of categorization endogeneity  (CE), 
meant  as  the  influence  of  endogenous  elements  (e.g.,  behavioral  traits)  in  group 
categorization. If CE is high, members of dominated groups can pass as members of 
dominant  groups  by  adopting  the  behavioral  norm  associated  with  that  group.  CE 
facilitates group equality by decreasing the ability to discriminate between members of 
dominant and dominated groups, but it weakens intra-group neighborhood effects. It is 
argued that, under sufficiently low levels of discrimination, CE widens the range of 
values of the neighborhood effects parameter for which group inequality is stable.  
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1. Introduction 
 
  Group inequality is still a commonly observed phenomenon worldwide. It occurs 
in a broad range of contexts: countries with both large populations (India, United States, 
Brazil, and Japan) and small populations (Belize, Trinidad and Tobago, Israel, and New 
Zealand); higher-income countries (Australia, Canada, Japan, and the United States), as 
well as in lower income countries (India, Belize, and South Africa); countries with high 
growth rates (Malaysia, Japan, Belize, and India), as well as in countries with low or 
negative growth rates (South Africa and New Zealand); and countries with high levels 
of general inequality (Brazil, South Africa, and Malaysia), as well as in countries with 
low levels of general inequality (Canada, India, Australia, and Israel) (Darity Jr. and 
Nembhard 2000). 
  Traditional economic analysis  has  focused on two main  explanations  for the 
existence of group inequality. The first one is that members of discriminated groups 
enjoy smaller returns on human capital investment, due to taste-based (Becker 1957) or 
occupational discrimination (e.g., Bergmann 1974). In this case, two equally qualified 
individuals coming from different groups will receive different wages due to pure taste 
discrimination or because individuals coming from discriminated groups are confined to 
low-wage sectors. 
The second explanation for group inequality is that members of discriminated 
groups accumulate less human capital than those coming from dominant groups. It can 
be  explained,  for  instance,  by  statistical  discrimination  (Phelps  1972,  Arrow  1973), 
discrimination in the access to and quality of schooling
1 or disadvantages accumulated 
over generations
2.  
Economic elements alone are not able to fully explain  group inequality. For 
instance, group discrimination is unprofitable to firms. Thus, competition  would make 
discrimination in the labor market disappear in the long run (Arrow 1973).  However, 
pure taste discrimination is still observed.  The usual explanation for this, statistical 
discrimination, is not satisfactory, as it relies on unrealistic postulates as the observation 
                                                 
1 It has as consequence not only smaller levels of education, but also smaller returns to education and 
earnings (Chiswick 1988).  
2  Becker  and  Tomes  (1986) discuss  how  families  concerned  about  the  welfare  of  their  children  can 
transmit them assets and earnings, stimulating their human capital accumulation.    3 
of individual‟s marginal productivity (Arrow 1998). This quotation from Arrow (1998) 
summarizes this view:  
 
I am going to suggest in this paper that market-based explanations will tend to 
predict that racial discrimination will be eliminated. Since they are not, we must 
seek  elsewhere  for  non-market  factors  influencing  economic  behavior.  The 
concepts of direct social interaction and networks seem to be good places to 
start (Arrow 1998: 2, italics added). 
 
  In  this  vein,  economists  are  more  and  more  convinced  that  social  elements 
should be taken into account for the sake of a better understanding of group inequality. 
It is widely recognized that one‟s conditions and incentives to adopt a pro-mobility 
behavior depends on the characteristics of one‟s reference group, or neighborhood. For 
instance, the individual cost of acquiring education may be decreasing in the average 
effort in education in one‟s residential area (Brock and Durlauf 2001). Groups defined 
along social rather than physical lines can also contribute to the persistence of group 
inequality.  Exclusion  may  lead  discriminated  social  categories,  as  Blacks  in  most 
Western countries, to adopt a detrimental behavior as behavioral prescriptions (Akerlof 
and Kranton 2000).  
Nonetheless, there is not a consensus among these sociological theories of group 
inequality regarding the role played by segregation on the persistence of group-based 
differences.  The  seminal  study  from  Loury  (1977)  argues  that  racial  inequality  can 
persist due to racial segregation. This view is shared by other studies as Bowles et al. 
(2007),  Bowles  and  Sethi  (2006),  Chaudhuri  and  Sethi  (2008)  and  Sethi  and 
Somanathan  (2004).  The  concern  here  is  with  inter-group  neighborhood  effects: 
segregation prevents members of dominated groups from enjoying positive externalities 
stemming from dominant groups.  
  Other sociological-based explanations for group inequality, however, argue that 
integration rather than segregation can contribute to the persistence of group inequality. 
The constitution of “oppositional identities” (Bisin et al. 2006), where the behavioral 
norms  associated  with  the  dominant  group  are  rejected,  can  be  stronger  in  mixed 
neighborhoods.  For  instance,  Fryer  and  Torelli  (2005)  find  that  the  punishment  to   4 
“acting  white”  behaviors  (e.g.,  put  more  effort  on  studies)  among  black  students  is 
stronger in racially mixed schools. Thus, segregation enforces group inequality through 
intra-group neighborhood effects, favoring the development of detrimental social norms 
among dominated groups.  
  The objective of this paper is to integrate economic and sociological elements in 
a model of human capital accumulation by  phenotypically distinct individuals. Both 
kinds of elements are influenced by a common element: the degree of categorization 
endogeneity.  By  categorization  endogeneity  I  mean  the  influence  of  endogenous 
elements, as behavioral traits, in group categorization. If categorization endogeneity is 
high, members of dominated groups can pass as members of dominant groups by, for 
example, adopting the behavioral norm associated with that group. 
In  the  model,  categorization  endogeneity  is  set  in  the  following  way:  self-
categorization  is  exogenous,  rooted  in  phenotypic  characteristics,  but 
heterocategorization  (categorization  by  others)  is  endogenous,  in  such  a  way  that 
members of the subaltern category may be seen by others as members of the dominant 
category  if  they  choose  to  acquire  education.  On  the  one  hand,  categorization 
endogeneity facilitates the acquisition of qualification by members of subaltern groups 
on a market point of view. If higher wages, access to education, better jobs etc are 
reserved to members of dominant groups, individuals coming from dominated groups 
would be better-off if they can pass as members of the dominant group by adopting 
some  behavioral  traits,  for  example.  In  other  words,  categorization  endogeneity 
decreases  the  “ability  to  discriminate”:  distinguishing  between  members  of  the 
dominant  group  and  idiosyncratic  members  of  dominated  groups  is  difficult  if 
categorization is essentially endogenous.  
A nice example to illustrate this point comes from the story of the Brazilian 
indigenous leader Marcos Terena
3. He managed to study until become a pilot of the 
Brazilian  Air  Force  saying  he  was  a  “Japanese”,  a  term  which  is  extended  also  to 
Japanese descendents in Brazil. Japanese is an ethnicity associated in Brazil with pro-
mobility behavior, as diligence in school. Thus, by adopting the Japanese behavioral 
prescription and taking advantage of the phenotypic similarity, Terena was able to adopt 
a Japanese identity and had access to the elements which allowed his upward mobility.  
                                                 
3 Terena published a letter telling his story in the Brazilian newspaper Jornal do Brasil.    5 
  On  the  other  hand,  categorization  endogeneity  can  be  harmful  to  the  human 
capital accumulation among members of dominated groups from the sociological point 
of view, as it weakens the within-group neighborhood effects. Throughout this paper, I 
am especially concerned with intra-group neighborhood effects. As emphasized by the 
literature, mutual influences are stronger if individuals belong to the same category, that 
is, if they share the same sense of identity. If group identity is rooted in endogenous 
elements,  as  behavioral  prescriptions,  members  of  dominated  groups  acquiring 
qualification may be seen as deserters of the group. Thus, they may not be followed by 
the  other  members  of  the  group.  Continuing  with  Terena‟s  story,  he  was  victim  of 
hostility  by  many  indigenous  and seen  by them  as  “White” due to  his  behavior.  If 
categorization was less endogenous, he could be imitated by more individuals from his 
group.  
  Beside this introduction, this paper is divided in four more parts. Section 2 sets 
the  theoretical  framework,  arguing  how  an  endogenous  categorization  may  weaken 
within-group  neighborhood  effects.  The  model  is  presented  in  Section  3.  Section  4 
makes an analysis of the dynamics of the model. Some concluding remarks take the last 
section.  
  The insights provided in this paper shed some light on the debate about the role 
played  by  segregation  on  the  persistence  of  group  inequality.  Integration  tends  to 
increase  categorization  endogeneity.  Segregated  societies,  thus,  can  present  higher 
levels of group inequality if anti-discrimination laws are weakly enforced. On the other 
hand, if anti-discrimination laws are strongly enforced, segregated societies can present 
lower levels of group inequality. 
 




  Neighborhood  effects  arise  when  individual  decisions  are  influenced  by  the 
actions taken by other members of some reference group. In general they are justified   6 
along psychological and sociological lines (Durlauf 2004)
4. Using criminal behavior as 
reference,  Glaeser  and  Scheinkman  (2001)  cite  some  channels  th rough  which 
neighborhood effects can take place, “ranging from pure physical externalities (while 
one person is being arrested, the police find it harder to arrest someone else), to learning 
from  one's  neighbors,  to  stigma  (the  more  people  who  are  committing  a  particular 
crime--the less likely is that crime to be a negative signal) to pure taste externalities 
(individuals just enjoy imitating others)” (Glaeser and Scheinkman 2001: 1). 
Groups can be defined along various lines. The element which appears more 
frequently as a group glue is physical proximity: in this setting, individuals influence 
each  other  because  they  are  physically  near.  In  Evans  et  al.  (1992),  for  example, 
neighbors are the students of some school.  
Nevertheless,  a  widespread  literature,  bringing  insights  from  other  social 
sciences, notably social psychology and sociology, suggests that social influence goes 
beyond geographic proximity. Rather, it has to do with how individuals are located in 
what Akerlof (1997) calls “social space”. This perception of neighborhood is supported 
by a sociological view of social interactions, based on “concepts that play little or no 
role in modern economics: class, community, culture, influence, status, gender roles, 
and so on” (Manski 2000: 12).  
I will term  the first  type of neighborhood as  physical  neighborhood and the 
second one, social neighborhood. For example, one‟s physical neighborhood is formed 
by her residential neighbors, her classmates, and all others who share with her some 
physical space. On the other hand, her social neighborhood is composed by those she 
identifies with: people from the same racial/ethnic group, from the same religion, and so 
on.  
  The channels through which physical and social groups influence their members 
bear some similarities. With the exception of physical externalities, other channels as 
conformism and stigma are present in both kinds of groups. The norms enforced by 
social groups are called social norms (Elster 1989) or behavioral prescriptions (Akerlof 
and Kranton 2000). A universally familiar example of social categorization concerns 
gender. Within this kind of categorization, there are two social groups or categories, 
                                                 
4  An  important  exception  concerns  local  public  finance  of  education.  In  this  case,  children  of  poor 
neighborhoods are affected by the low level of local per pupil expenditure. To more on this, see Hussar 
and Sonnenberg (2001).   7 
man  and  woman.  To  each  social  category,  it  is  associated  a  set  of  behavioral 
prescriptions,  which  can  be  interpreted  as  the  ideal  behavior  for  each  category. 
Following  this  example,  there  are  behavioral  prescriptions  for  gender  categories 
regarding  dressing  (e.g.,  only  women  are  supposed  to  wear  dresses),  jobs  (e.g., 
firefighters are men, while nurses are women), family roles (the father is responsible for 
providing the financial resources, while the mother should stay at home taking care of 
the children), among other aspects. 
  Some  studies  present  empirical  evidence  on  the  influence  of  physical 
neighborhood on individual behavior. Case and Katz (1991), analyzing young men in 
poor Boston neighborhoods, found significant peer effects on criminal behavior, drug 
and alcohol use, church attendance and labor market activity. Crane (1991) concludes 
that  the  percentage  of  workers  with  professional  or  managerial  job  in  PUMS 
neighborhoods affects 16-19 years old women behavior regarding dropping out of high 
school and fertility. However, the importance of neighborhood effects is not consensual 
among empirical studies. Evans et al. (1992), for instance, studying teenager behavior 
regarding  dropping  out  of  high  school  and  pregnancy,  found  no  evidence  of 
neighborhood  effects  once  endogeneity  of  neighborhood  is  controlled  for  by 
instrumental variables.  
  Empirical studies also show the importance of social neighborhoods. In general, 
such  effects  are  analyzed  together  with  the  impact  of  physical  neighborhoods.  For 
instance, Borjas (1992) stress the importance of the so-called “ethnic capital”, defined 
as the average skills of the ethnic group in the parents‟ generation, on children skills. It 
was shown that ethnic capital matters even among individuals who grow up in the same 
neighborhood (Borjas 1995). Another example is the study of Aizer and Currie (2004), 
which found evidence that the use of prenatal care public programs is highly correlated 
within groups defined using race/ethnicity and neighborhoods. Bertrand et al. (2000) 
show that individuals surrounded by others who speak the same language increase their 
use of welfare programs if their language group also does so.  
 
Neighborhood effects and group inequality 
   8 
  Group-led  behavior  can  contribute  to  the  persistence  of  group  inequality. 
Unfavorable initial conditions can persist in locally segregated groups. This link can 
emerge  due  to  a  lot  of  reasons,  as  exemplified  by  Brock  and  Durlauf  (2001):  the 
individual cost in acquiring education can be negatively associated to one‟s neighbors 
educational  effort,  children‟s  educational  decision  is  influenced  by  observed 
education/occupation outcomes  among  adults  in  their community and the chance of 
making a successful job application depends on information possessed by members of 
one‟s social network.  
The norms engendered by social groups can also lead to group-based inequality. 
Indeed, as social norms are not outcome-oriented, there is no guarantee that will make 
all group members better-off (Elster 1989). Dominated groups can develop behavioral 
prescriptions which are incompatible with socio-economic mobility, perpetuating their 
inferior  position.  In  Akerlof  and  Kranton  (2000)  framework,  for  example,  this  is 
explained by exclusion per se. Discriminated groups would feel a strong anxiety if they 
adopted  pro-mobility  behavioral  prescriptions,  as  exclusion  would  prevent  them  to 
follow  such  prescriptions.  For  example,  some  studies  point  that  African  American 
youth,  recognizing  societal  iniquity  in  confront  with  their  group,  may  come  to  feel 
education  as  of  little  usefulness  for  their  economic  and  social  mobility.  Thus, 
adolescents  identified  with  the  Black  culture  may  present  targets  of  low  academic 
achievement (Chavous et al. 2003). 
In other approaches,  anti-mobility behavioral  prescriptions  are more implicit. 
According  to  the  social  dominance  theory  (Pratto  et  al.  2006),  for  example,  group 
inequality  is  seen  as  something  natural  by  both  dominant  and,  in  a  less  extent, 
dominated  groups.  Nothing  should  be  done  to  change  this  situation.  Group-based 
inequality is justified by the dissemination and acceptance of the so-called hierarchy-
enhancing legitimizing myths (HE-LM): 
 
Hierarchy-enhancing  legitimizing  myths  (HE-LMs)  provide  moral  and 
intellectual  justification for  group-based  oppression  and  inequality.  Examples 
include myriad forms of racism, sexism, heterosexism, stereotypes, notions of 
“fate,” just world beliefs, nationalism, Confucianism, the doctrine of meritorious 
karma,  classism,  the  Divine  Rights  of  Kings,  Manifest  Destiny,  and  internal 
attributions  for  poverty.  Such  disparate  myths  have  been  used  to  argue  that   9 
inequality is fair, legitimate, natural, or moral. Hierarchy-enhancing legitimizing 
myths not only organize individual, group, and institutional behavior in ways 
that  sustain  dominance,  they  often  lead  subordinates  to  collaborate  with 
dominants in the maintenance of oppression (Pratto et al. 2006: 7, italics in the 
original).  
 
The same way neighborhood effects can lead to detrimental behavior, they can 
contribute  to  the  erosion  of  group-based  differences  through  the  so-called  social 
multiplier (Glaeser et al. 2002). Deviations from the group enforced behavior by some 
members  can  lead  other  group  members  to  change  their  behavior  too,  eventually 
guiding  the  whole  group  towards  a  new  set  of  norms,  in  such  a  way  that  group 
inequality  is  eliminated  or  at  least  diminished.  Deviant  behavior  can  have  a  lot  of 
sources:  individuals  being  affected  by  public  policies;  noises  or  mutations,  as  in 
stochastic  evolutionary  game  theory  models  (e.g.,  Kandori  et  al.  1993);  intentional 
idiosyncratic  play  (Bowles  2004);  or  the  presence  of  individuals  not  influenced  by 
others‟ actions, the fixed agents (Glaeser and Scheinkman 2001)
5.  
  Not just physical neighborhoods, but also social neighborhoods can have their 
norms affected by deviant behavior. One example is the feminist revolution. Popularly, 
the feminist movement was launched in U. S. by the book  The Feminine Mystique, 
written by Betty Friedan in 1963. After that, there was a great incursion of females in 
predominantly  male  occupations.  In  U.  S.,  between  1970  and  1990,  there  was  an 
increase of the percent female in virtually all 45 Census occupations, except in some 
traditionally female jobs (as dietitians and speech therapists). Moreover, some former 
predominantly male occupations turned to be predominantly female, as underwriters 
and  psychologists  (Blau  et  al.  1998).  It  represented  a  change  in  female  behavioral 
prescriptions concerning family roles (weakening of the housewife stereotype), as well 
as those related to occupations. 
 
Endogenous and exogenous categorizations 
 
                                                 
5 Fixed agents are not just a theoretical curiosity. Experiments run by Falk et al. (2003) show that about 
10%  of  experiment‟  participants  were  not  influenced  by  their  peers‟  decisions  regarding  group 
contributions.    10 
  It was argued that groups – of both physical and social nature – can enforce 
behaviors that can be detrimental to their members. A crucial point to understand what 
kind of neighborhood effects will emerge in a given society is the way individuals place 
themselves and others in social groups – the process known as categorization. To what 
categories  the  individual  identifies  with?  Which  individuals  will  be  considered  as 
members of these categories? On the answers to these questions depends the formation 
of both  physical  and social  groups. These questions  refer to  the two dimensions  of 
categorization: the way individuals group themselves and how individuals place others 
– self-categorization and heterocategorization, respectively. 
Some categorizations are essentially exogenous. An example of this first type of 
categorization  is  gender  categorization.  In  this  case,  individuals  generally  group 
themselves  and  others  in  one  of  the  two  categories  –  males  and  females  –  in  an 
unambiguous way driven by easily observable exogenous characteristics.  
Notwithstanding, other types of categorization are at least partially endogenous. 
Ethnic/racial categorizations are good examples of this second kind of grouping. In this 
case,  categorization  is  driven  not  just  by  exogenous  individual  characteristics  –  as 
phenotype  –  but  also  by  endogenous  elements  regarding  the  individual  (e.g.  social 
status) and the environment (e.g. social and historical context).  
The fluidity of racial categorization is partially explained by the fact that an 
individual has at least three racial identities: an internal one (what she tells himself 
about his race), an external one (what others believe his race to be) and an expressed 
one (what she wants his actions and words to indicate to others about his race). These 
three  types  of  racial  identity  need  not  be  either  identical  (although  they  are  not 
independent)  or  consistent  across  social  contexts,  being  influenced  by  racial 
composition and ideology of contexts, as well as by the extent to which an individual is 
known in a particular setting (Harris and Sim 2000). 
The literature brings abundant evidence that ethnic/racial categorization may be 
essentially endogenous. For example, Miguel and Posner (2006), analyzing data from 
twelve African countries, concluded that ethnic identification is positively related to 
employment in non-traditional economic sectors and to the proximity of the survey to a 
competitive national election. Working with U.K. data, Bisin et al. (2006) found that the 
main  determinants  of  ethnic  identity  include  past  racial  harassment  experiences, 
language spoken at home and with friends, quality of housing, structure of the family   11 
and degree of neighborhood segregation. Even a country as United States, in which 
there  already  was  a  legal  definition  of  race  –  and,  thus,  supposed  to  have  a  more 
exogenous racial categorization – presents a significant degree of racial endogeneity
6. In 
the U. S. prior to the Civil War, marked by racist rules, African descendents, especially 
mulattoes,  could  be  “white”  by  behavior  and  reputation  (Bodenhorn  and  Ruebeck 
2003). 
If categorization is significantly endogenous, the boundaries between dominant 
and dominated groups are much more fluid. Membership in the dominant (dominated) 
group is associated with the adoption of a pro-(anti-) mobility behavior. For instance, in 
Rwanda, the Tutsi is the dominant group and the Hutu, the dominated one. Thus, those 
with lots of cattle were classified as a Tutsi, and the poorer ones, as Hutu (Bowen 
1996).  
 
Endogenous categorization and neighborhood effects 
 
  As  argued  before,  deviations  from  group  enforced  behavior  can  lead  to  the 
displacement of group norms. Nonetheless, the endogeneity of categorization poses a 
challenge  to  such  a  process.  If  grouping  is  rooted  in  exogenous,  easily  observable 
elements, identity is not affected by behavior. In this case, idiosyncratic individuals will 
be still seen as members of some reference group. On the other hand, if categorization is 
endogenous,  membership  in  the  reference  group  is  evaluated  on  the  basis  of  the 
commitment  with  group‟s  behavioral  prescriptions.  If  one  plays  idiosyncratically, 
departing from group‟s behavioral prescriptions, she can be expelled from the reference 
group.  
  The transition to a new set of group enforced norms is easier in the first case 
than in the second one. An example will illustrate better this point. Suppose some group 
is characterized by a low level of human capital accumulation. In order to combat group 
inequality,  the  government  implements  some  public  policy  with  the  objective  of 
increasing human capital accumulation by the members of this group. Due to variation 
                                                 
6 In this country, “the records of governmental specification of rules of racial identity associated with 
peoples of African descent were established both through legislation and court decisions (Darity Jr. et al. 
2006: 288)”.    12 
in the personal willingness of accumulate human capital, just some members of this 
group, in a first moment, decide to augment their human capital stock.  
  What will happen with the remaining, more conformist members of the group? If 
categorization is exogenous, it is not affected by individual choices. Thus, the deviant 
members will be still seen as members of the group. Consequently, the more conformist 
members  of  the  group  will  perceive  an  increase  in  the  average  human  capital 
accumulated by group members and they will be stimulated to doing the same. With the 
majority  of  group  members  changing  their  choices,  the  group  prescribed  behavior 
would  transit  from  a  low-level  human  capital  accumulation  to  a  high-level  human 
capital accumulation.  
  On the other hand, if categorization is endogenous, deviant members would no 
more be seen as members of the group, as they are breaking with the group‟ prescribed 
behavior.  So,  conformist  members  would  not  perceive  an  increase  in  the  average 
accumulated human capital of the group. They would tend not to change their levels of 
human capital accumulation and the transition to a new group rule would not occur.  
  It  clearly  has  important  implications  regarding  the  overriding  of  group 
inequality. If categorization is endogenous, members of dominated groups adopting a 
pro-mobility behavior can lose identity links with the more conformist members of the 
group.  The  group  stimulus  to  these  members  to  choose  a  pro-mobility  behavior  is 
weaker, as the idiosyncratic members would be seen as “deserters” of the group.  
 
3. The Model 
 
The  following  model  will  formalize  the  ideas  presented  above.  There  is 
population composed by genetically distinct individuals. There are two social categories 
in this society: the Blues and the Greens. A fraction β of this population owns a gene G, 
which generates a physical, easily observable characteristic associated with the Green 
social group. For instance, this gene can be associated with skin darkness and the Green 
group can be the Black social category. This society is also characterized by group 
hierarchy, in such a way that the Blues are the dominant group and the Greens, the 
dominated one.   13 
Individuals live for two periods. In the first one, or childhood, they choose to 
acquire education or not. In the second period, adulthood, they will work as qualified or 
unqualified employees. When she arrives at the second period, the individual generates, 
by cloning, a genetically identical child. At the end of the second period, the individual 
dies  and  her  child  becomes  an  adult.  Thus,  the  population  is  composed  by  two 
generations of equal and constant size. Let us normalize this size to one.  
Self-categorization  is  exogenously  –  that  is,  genetically  –  determined.  Thus, 
individuals with (without) the gene G self-classify as Green (Blue). On the other hand, 
heterocategorization  follows  both  exogenous  and  endogenous  lines.  Individuals  are 
classified by others as Green or Blue not just according to their physical appearance, but 
also according to their educational choice. As the Blues are the social dominant group, 
they have as behavioral prescription the pro-mobility attitude, that is, the acquisition of 
education. Similarly, the Greens are supposed not to acquire education. The probability 
of an individual i be classified as member of group j is equal to 
 
j i j j i j j i E G P , , , ) 1 (  
 
  In  the  equation  above,  Gi,j  is  equal  to  one  if  the  phenotype  of  individual  i 
corresponds to the phenotype associated with category j, and zero otherwise. Similarly, 
Ei,j is equal to one if the behavior of individual i matches the prescribed behavior of 
category j, being zero otherwise. The parameter μj is equal to 0.5αj, where αj varies 
between zero and one and measures the degree of endogeneity of category j, being αG 
greater than αB. For sake of simplicity, let us set αB equal to zero
7 and call αG simply α.  
  Therefore,  individuals  without  gene  G  are  classified  by  others  as  Blues. 
Individuals with the gene are classified as Green with probability 1 if not acquiring 
education, but they will be classified as Blue with probability μ if acquiring education. 
                                                 
7 This simplifying assumption has a strong empirical support. In their study using Brazilian data, Telles 
and Lim (1998) shows that, while 88% of Whites were consistently classified (that is, self-classification is 
consistent with other classification), this value was 58.5% for Blacks. Moreover, more educated self-
classified Blacks were more likely to be classified as Whites. Analyzing data from 15-59-year-old women 
from Recife (Brazil), Miranda-Ribeiro and Caetano (2005) concluded that consistence between self- and 
other-categorization is greater among White women It suggests that categorization endogeneity works 
much more as an upward mechanism rather than a downward device: the entrance in the dominant group 
through the adoption of its behavioral prescriptions is easier than the downward grading to the dominated 
group of misbehaving members of the dominant group.   14 
Note that if α is equal to one, an educated Green is randomly classified by others as 
Blue or Green.  
  In case of acquiring education, an individual self-classified as member of group j 
enjoys the following pay-off: 
 
) 1 ( ) 1 ( ,
^
, , t j i j i t j i s a r a  
 
  In the first term of the equation above, rj is the expected pecuniary pay-off for 
educated  members  of  group  j.  It  encompasses  the  expected  pecuniary  return  to 
education and the expected pecuniary costs of educational effort. In the second term, γ(1 
–  t j s ,
^
)  is  the  social  cost  of  acquiring  education,  where  γ  is  the  social  interactions 
parameter which measures the strength of neighborhood effects and  t j s ,
^
 is the observed 
fraction of educated members of group j at time t. It captures the idea that the individual 
is influenced by the educational choices made by the members of the group she belongs 
to. The higher the observed fraction of educated contemporaneous members of her 
reference group, the easier will it be for her to be come educated too. These two terms 
are weighted by ai, the individual level of non-conformism, which ranges between zero 
and one. Less conformist individuals have a pay-off which is more dependent on the 
pecuniary pay-off; on the other hand, more conformist individuals face greater costs 
when  departing  from  their  peers‟  choices.  In  case  of  not  acquiring  education,  the 
individual will have a pay-off equal to zero. 
  Qualified Blue employees enjoy an economic pay-off equal to r. Thus, rB is 
simply r. Additionally, qualified Green workers may suffer a decrease in this pay-off in 
an amount equal to d. This parameter reflects the degree of discrimination in this society 
and is smaller than r. This can be due to any form of direct discrimination, as taste 
discrimination  in  the  labor  market,  denied  access  to  good  schools  or  education 
borrowing constraints. However, in μ percent of the time a qualified Green worker will 
be classified as Blue, not suffering this discount d. Thus, the expected economic return 
for qualified Green workers will be 
   15 
rG = r – (1 – μ)d 
 
  Let sB,t and sG,t   be, respectively, the real fractions of Blues and Greens who 
opted to acquire education at time t. The observed fractions will be  
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  In  the  equation  that  represents  the  observed  fraction  of  qualified  Blue 
individuals, the denominator shows the fraction of individuals who are viewed as Blues 
in the society, that is, all individuals who are genetically Blue and the fraction μ of 
idiosyncratic  Greens.  The  numerator  is  the  share  of  such  individuals  that  acquired 
education.  The  observed  fraction  of  educated  Greens  can  be  explained  in  a  similar 
fashion. It is important to stress that, if CE is null, observed and real fractions of skilled 
workers are equal. 
  Individuals  will  decide  to  acquire  education  if  their  respective  pay-offs  are 
greater than zero. The less conformist individuals are more prone to become educated, 
so it can be said that an individual will acquire education if her non-conformism level is 
above some threshold level ã. Ignoring time subscripts, these levels are, for each social 
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  Therefore, at time t + 1, the fraction of educated individuals will be equal to the 
fraction of individuals whose non-conformism level was greater than ã at time t. To 
simplify, let us suppose that a is uniformly distributed between zero and 1 for both 
genetic groups. In this case, we have 
 
t B t B a s ,
~
1 , 1                                                                                                              (1.A) 
t G t G a s ,
~
1 , 1                                                                                                              (1.B) 
 
4. Dynamics of the model 
 
  A  point  } , {
* *
G B s s is  stationary  if  it  is  a  solution  to  the  system  of  difference 
equations represented by 1.A and 1.B: 
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  Furthermore,  the  stationary  point  is  stable  if  the  Jacobean  matrix  of  the 
dynamical system at this point has all eigenvalues strictly less than one. The system 
analyzed here has three possible stable stationary points
8: 
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  I will call these states, respectively, the high level state (HS), the unequal state 
(US) and the low level state (LS). It is important to stress that LS is also an unequal 
                                                 
8 There is a fourth fixed point, but it is not stable. See Appendix for details.    17 
state, since in  this  situation the fraction of qualified Blue individuals  will  never be 
inferior to the share of educated Green individuals. The existence and stability of these 
points depend on the neighborhood effects parameter. I will set two crucial values of γ, 
γ
G = (1 – μ)rG and γ
B = γ
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is a non-negative constant. It can be shown that
9: 
 
i) If 0 < γ < γ
G, HS is the unique stationary stable state (Situation 1). 
ii) If γ
G < γ < γ
B, US is the unique stationary stable state (Situation 2). 
iii) If γ > γ
B, LS is the unique stationary stable state (Situation 3). 
 
  Thus,  under  small  values  of  γ,  all  members  of  both  groups  would  acquire 
education. If γ is sufficiently high, just a fraction of both groups will acquire education. 
Finally,  under  intermediate  values  of  γ,  all  members  of  the  dominant  group  and  a 
fraction of the dominate group would acquire education. It is important to stress that γ
B 
represents the neighborhood effects parameter below which all Blue individuals will 
choose to be qualified and γ
G is the parameter below which all Greens will choose to 
acquire education. The better condition for the qualification of Blue individuals can be 
seen by the fact that γ
B
 is greater than γ
G. Note also that γ
G is the expected return for 
qualified Greens multiplied by the “ability to discriminate”, which reaches its maximum 
value (one) when endogeneity is zero.  
The following phase diagrams will illustrate these points. Note that, while sG,t+1 
depends solely on sG,t, sB,t+1 is a function of sB,t and sG,t. Thus, 
*
G s  is determined first 
and, then, 
*
B s . If γ is sufficiently low, 
*
G s  will be equal to 1. In this case, 
*
B s  will 
necessarily be equal to 1 too. This situation corresponds to the HS and is depicted in 
                                                 
9 The demonstration is in the Appendix.    18 
Figure 1(a). For higher levels of γ, 
*
G s  is smaller than 1. In this case, 
*
B s  can be equal to 
[Figure 1(b)] or – if γ is sufficiently high – smaller than 1 [Figure 1(c)], engendering US 
or LS, respectively.  
 
Figure 1: Situations 1 (a), 2 (b) and 3 (c).   19 
  It is important to stress that the equilibria are Pareto-rankable. LS is the worst 
one. US is Pareto-superior to LS, as the fraction of qualified Blue individuals increases 
without a decrease in the fraction of qualified Green individuals. Finally, HS is Pareto-
superior to US, given that the fraction of qualified Green individuals goes to one. 
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which is non-negative. In fact, the higher the level of categorization endogeneity, the 
greater  is  the  probability  of  incorporation  of  qualified  Green  workers  in  the  Blue 
reference group. Moreover, 
 







which is negative if d < r /(2 – α). The effect of higher levels of CE in γ
G is twofold. 
First, it increases the expected wage for qualified Green workers, as they will be more 
likely  misclassified  as  Blue.  Second,  it  decreases  the  “ability  to  discriminate”, 
weakening the positive externalities. It occurs because, in this situation, qualified Green 
workers are “expelled” from the Green reference group with a greater probability. 
Thus,  for  sufficiently  low  levels  of  discrimination,  the  endogeneity  of 
categorization turns the unequal state more likely. This is shown in Figure 2. If d is 
smaller  than  r/(2  –  α)  [Figure  2(a)],  higher  values  of  endogeneity  of  categorization 
increases the range of values of the social interactions parameter for which the unequal 
state is stable. Conversely [Figure 2(b)], if discrimination is high, this range is broader 
and is more constant regarding the level of categorization endogeneity.    20 
 
Figure 2: States which are stable for each combination of α and γ. The graphic on the 
left  (a) corresponds  to  d = 0.2  and the one on the right  (b), to  d = 0.6. The other 
parameters assumed in the construction of the figure are r = 1 and β = 0.5. 
 
  Therefore, group inequality may be more likely in a less discriminatory society 
than  in  a  more  discriminatory  one  if  they  differ  in  their  level  of  categorization 
endogeneity.  Suppose  there  are  two  societies,  A  and  B,  which  differ  just  in  two 
elements:  the  level  of  discrimination  and  the  degree  of  categorization  endogeneity. 
Discrimination is higher in A (dA > dB), but categorization is more endogenous in B (μB 
> μA). Both societies are composed by two groups. It is possible that HS is less likely to 
take place in society B than in society A – that is, that γ
G
A is higher than γ
G
B. Simple 
algebraic manipulation shows such will occurs only if 
 
d







where Δμ = μB – μA and Δd = dA – dB, with the condition that dB < r/(2 – μA – μB). Thus, 
a  less  discriminatory  society  can  experience  a  greater  difficulty  in  reaching  full 
educational achievement than a more discriminatory one, if the difference between their 
levels  of  categorization  endogeneity  were  sufficiently  higher  than  the  difference 
between their degrees of discrimination.  
 
4.1. The “melting pot solution”   21 
 
  An important shortcoming of the model presented here is that self-categorization 
is exogenous. This premise is unrealistic, as discussed in the previous section. In fact, 
one‟s identity choice is influenced by endogenous elements. By allowing individuals to 
choose their membership, it is opened a new room to group inequality erosion: it is 
possible that some members of the subaltern group may found reasonable to adopt the 
dominant  group  identity  in  order  to  avoid  greater  social  losses  when  acquiring 
education. I will name it the “melting pot solution”.  
It  poses  the  importance  of  the  definition  of  group  when  discussing  group 
inequality. In the traditional economic analysis, which considers group categorization as 
exogenous, the conception of group as a set of individuals who share the same identity 
sense coincides with the idea of group formed by individuals with the same exogenous 
characteristic (skin color, ancestry etc). Nevertheless, if CE is taken into consideration, 
there  is  a  disjunction  between  these  two  concepts  of  group.  By  treating  self-
categorization as exogenous, I am going in hand with Telles and Lim‟ (1998) argument 
that  self-classification  is  not  the  most  appropriate  method  for  determining  group 
inequality.  
Made  this  warning,  the  results  of  this  model  may  be  reinterpreted  in  the 
following way: if a given society finds itself out of the full educational achievement 
equilibrium,  the  only  way  to  reach  it  is  through  the  cultural  assimilation  of  the 
dominated group by the dominant one. That is, the former should give up its identity 
and adopts the latter‟s identity. In other words, the results presented here hold just if the 
“melting pot solution”, by some reason, is not available.  
 
5. Concluding remarks 
 
  A model of qualification acquisition by phenotypically distinct individuals was 
presented above. It was shown that, under sufficiently small levels of discrimination, the 
endogeneity of the categorization turns the unequal state more likely: the higher the 
degree  of  endogeneity,  the  wider  is  the  range  of  values  of  the  social  interactions 
parameter for which the unequal state is asymptotically stable.   22 
  The results presented here shed some light on the discrepancies regarding the 
impact of segregation on the persistence of group inequality. Segregation limits ethnic 
or  racial  admixture,  making  easier  the  categorization  through  individual  phenotypic 
characteristics. Conversely, when categorization through exogenous, easily observable 
features is difficult or not possible, individuals are placed according to other elements, 
as behavioral traits (Humphreys et al. 2002). Thus, segregation reduces the endogeneity 
of categorization.  
  Therefore, segregation would be positively related with group inequality when 
anti-discriminatory laws are not effectively enforced. In this situation, although intra-
group  neighborhoods  effects  are  strong,  members  of  subaltern  groups  are  heavily 
penalized by discrimination.  It  seems  to  be the  case, for instance, of the scheduled 
castes in India
10.  
  On  the  other  hand,  segregation  would  contribute  to  the  erosion  of  group 
differences when discrimination was bellowing some degree. In this case,  the losses 
coming  from  the  weakening  of  neighborhood  effects  would  overcome  the  gains 
stemming from the smaller “ability to discriminate”. It helps to understand why group 
inequality is decreasing faster in a more segregated country, as South Africa, than in a 
more integrated country, as Brazil, even if discrimination seems to be higher in the 
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Appendix: Fixed points and stability 
 
  Making  1 , , t G t G s s   and  1 , , t B t B s s   and  simplifying,  we  have  the  following 
solutions to the system formed by equations (1.A) and (1.B): 
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  These points will be termed FP (fixed point) 1,  2, 3 and 4, respectively.  The 
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  A  FP  {s*G,  s*B}  will  be  stable  if  the  eigenvalues  of  J(s*G,  s*B)  are  strictly 
smaller than 1. Substituting FP1 in (A.1) and simplifying, we have 
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  The first eigenvalue is greater than the second one. To see this, note that r ≥ rG 
and (1 – β)/[1 – β(1 – μ)] ≤ 1. Thus, if the first one is smaller than one, so are both. It 




  Substituting FP2 in (A.1) and simplifying, we have 
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  The first eigenvalue is smaller than one if γ is greater than (1 – μ)rG. This is also 
the condition which guarantees that s*G exists, that is, is between zero and one. The 
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  Substituting FP3 in (A.1) and simplifying, we have 
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  The first eingenvalue is smaller than one if γ is smaller than (1 – μ)[r – d(1 – α)]. 
However, under this condition, the second eigenvalue is greater than one. Thus, FP3 
cannot be stable.  
  Finally, substituting FP4 in (A.1) and simplifying, we have 
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The second eigenvalue is greater than the first one.  Thus, both will be smaller 












d r d r r  
 
  It also guarantees that both s*G and s*B are between zero and one.  